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Thus, the issue as to whether privity is necessary in West
Virginia for a suit on implied warranty is torn between dicta of
the 1939 Burgess case and the 1956 federal case. It appears that
the West Virginia position in regard to the privity question at issue
in the principal case remains to be sufficiently answered in future
litigation.
John I. Rogers, 11

Torts-The Fall of the Charitable Immunity Doctrine
P, a patient in D hospital, fell against a hot radiator while being
given a bath by a hospital orderly. P's action to recover damages
for personal injuries was based on the alleged negligence of the
orderly in failing to remove P from his peril. P also alleged negligence of D in the hiring and retention of the orderly. The trial
court, relying on the doctrine of charitable immunity, entered
summary judgment for D. Held, reversed. The court departed
from stare decisis on the ground that charitable hospitals are no
longer essentially charitable within the classical definition of the
word. Today they are managed like business corporations and
should be responsible for the torts of their servants while in the
scope of their employment. Adkins v. Saint Francis Hosp., 143
S.E.2d 154 (W. Va. 1965).
English courts introduced the doctrine of charitable immunity
in Duncan v. Findlater,7 C1 .&F. 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (H.L. 1839),
and Feofees of Heriots Hosp. v. Ross, 12 Cl. & F. 507, 8 Eng.
Rep. 1508 (H.L. 1846). It was later repudiated in Mersey Docks
Trustees v. Gibbs, L.R. 1 H.L. 93 (1866). Maryland and Massachusetts adopted the rule after it had been repudiated by English
courts. Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20, 52 Am. Rep. 495
(1885); McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432,
21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876).
Most state courts applied the doctrine in early decisions. Through
the years many exceptions to the doctrine have been developed,
but to delineate each would be impractical. In 1940, Oklahoma
became one of the first states to abolish the charitable immunity
doctrine. Gable v. Salvation Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P.2d 244
(1940). In the principal case Judge Caplan cited a leading case
in this area, President & Directors of Georgetown College v.
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Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942), which abrogated the
charitable immunity doctrine because it was no longer applicable
to modem society.
The charitable immunity doctrine was first announced in West
Virginia in Roberts v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp., 98 W. Va. 476, 127
S.E. 318 (1925). The court stated that the doctrine would be
applicable to a charitable hospital with one exception. Only in the
negligent hiring and retention of employees and resulting injury
to a patient would the hospital be liable.
With immunity the rule and liability the exception, another case
followed Roberts, adding that possession of liability insurance by
the charitable corporation did not alter the doctrine of immunity.
Fisher v. Ohio Valley Gen.Hosp. Ass'n, 137 W. Va. 723, 73 S.E.2d
667 (1952). A second step toward abolishment of the doctrine
came in Koehler v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 137 W. Va. 764,
776, 73 S.E.2d 673, 679 (1952). Here it was held that a stranger
or an invitee could recover when injured by the negligence of a
charitable hospital employee.

At this point in the history of the doctrine in West Virginia, the
only person who could not recover damages for his injuries was the
most'logical reclipien7ft the patient.' The c6urt in the Adkih case
ended this inequity by allowing the patient to recover upon the
doctrine of respondeat superior. The court stated that recovery
should be granted, whether the patient be paying or non-paying,
because charity undertaken in a careless or wanton manner is an
actionable wrong.
As the doctrine was not part of the common law of West Virginia,
legislative action was not needed to abolish it. The doctrine of stare
decisis may be abandoned, but only when urgent reason requires
such departure. The modem characteristics of charitable hospitals
being non-charitable within the usual context of the word charity,
but more business-like in nature, necessitated the abolishment of
the rule. As Judge Caplan emphasized, "Reason requires this result
-justice demands it."
The Adkins case can be extended by analogy to all charitable
organizations except those with governmental or municipal affiliations. Judge Caplan states ".

.

. [W]e elect to adhere to what we

consider the better reasoned decisions and abrogate completely the
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so-called immunity rule." West Virginia has never applied the
doctrine to churches, colleges and other charities. However, the
language of Judge Caplan and the trend illustrated by a Washington decision would seem to indicate that West Virginia would
refuse to apply the doctrine of charitable immunity in such cases.
The Washington court held that churches, colleges and other charities are liable to non-piying patrons or to paying patrons injured
as a result of negligence of the charity's employees. Friendv. Cove
Methodist Church, Inc., 396 P.2d 546 (Wash. 1964).
Closely related to the doctrine of charitable immunity are the
doctrines of "governmental and parental immunity. A thorough
analysis of these doctrines would be beyond the scope of this
comment, but mention should be made of the possible effect of
the Adkins decision on the future application of these doctrines in
West Virginia.
The rule -that immunity from liability- must be, granted to- the
state seems to have originated from the assumption that the King
can do no wrong. Downs v. Lazzelle, 102 W. Va. 663, 136 S.E. 195
(1926). W. VA. CONST. art, 6; § 35 (Michie 1961) provides,."The
State of West Virginia shall never be made defendant in any court
of law or equity ...
." Notwithstanding this constitutional immunity, several West'Virginia 'cases have-lloved recoveries agafnst
county courts, boards of education, municipalities and other organizations created for governmental purposes. However, recovery
always seems to turn upon whether the negligent activity complained of was proprietary, as distinguished from governmental.
Ward v. County Court of Raleigh County, 141 W. Va. 730, 738, 93
S.E.2d 44, 48 (1956).
West Virginia courts strongly adhere to the doctrine of governmental immunity, allowing recovery only when negligence occurs
in a proprietary act. Other states have limited the doctrine. An
Illinois court refused to apply the doctrine to a school district,
allowing a student to recover for injuries received in an accident
caused by the negligence of a school bus driver. The court stated
that it had created the doctrine of school district immunity and
did not need legislative help to abrogate it. Molitor v. Kaneland
Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11, 25, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96
(1959).
In 1961 a California court completely abolished governmental
immunity without legislative aid. Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist.,
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55 Cal.2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961). The legislature refused to
recognize this judicial decision and ordered a two year moratorium
on suits against the state until an exhaustive study of the problem
could be made. Subsequently the legislature substantially abolished
governmental immunity in California. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 945
(Deering Supp. Oct. 1963).
West Virginia seems destined to continue to abide by the doctrine of governmental immunity, allowing recovery only upon the
basis of negligence in proprietary functions. In any event, governmental immunity involves questions somewhat beyond the scope of
this comment.
Another question raised by the principal case is whether the abolition of the charitable immunity doctrine will have any effect upon
the doctrine of parental immunity. In West Virginia an unemancipated minor cannot recover in a tort action against a parent. The
reasoning is that it is better for an occasional wrong to go unpunished than for family life to be subjected to turmoil. Securo v.
Securo, 110 W.Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931).
However, one West Virginia case has allowed a child to recover
from her parent. Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
The child, a passenger on a bus driven by her father, received injuries from hot water spurting from a negligently maintained radiator. This case is distinguishable from Securo v. Securo in that the
parent was covered by liability insurance in the Lusk case. In
allowing the child to recover, the court stated that a recovery would
not destroy the domestic tranquility of the family. Because the
reason for immunity was no longer present, the rule failed. Despite
this case the doctrine of parental immunity seems to be soundly
entrenched in West Virginia. In this aspect West Virginia is in
line with a large majority of states.
An analysis of state decisions concerning charitable immunity indicates a definite trend toward abolition of the doctrine. In a recent
Illinois decision, Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial
Hosp., 34 U.S.L. Wx 2178 (Ill. Sept. 29, 1965), the court held
that a charitable hospital was liable for its torts and that its liability was not limited to the amount of insurance coverage. Many
state courts are applying the rationale that a rule should not be
applied when the reason for its existence fails. A few states, having abolished charitable immunity, have followed with the abolish-
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ment of governmental immunity. The doctrine of parental immunity, however, continues to be firmly applied by the states. It is
not probable that the Adkins decision will have any effect on the
application of the doctrines of governmental and parental immuity in West Virginia.
James Truman Cooper

ABSTRACTS
Conflicts of Law-Collateral Attack of Foreign Divorce Decrees
The petitioner was granted a divorce in the State of Florida in
1945. The award of alimony purported to bind the husband's
estate. Under Florida law such an arrangement is not valid without an express agreement of the parties. The husband made no
appeal for correction of the decree. After her husband's death in
1958, the petitioner instituted an action in a West Virginia circuit
court in order to determine her rights in the estate. The trial
court held the divorce decree to be invalid and unenforceable to
the extent that it would be binding upon the husband's estate.
On appeal the West Virginia Supreme Court upheld the collateral
attack. Certiorari was then granted by the United States Supreme
Court, and the decision was reversed based upon the reply by the
Florida appellate court to certain certified questions. Aldrich v.
Aldrich, 378 U.S. 540 (1964).
Article IV, section 1, of the federal constitution requires that a
judgment of one state be given full faith and credit in every other
state. As a consequence it is generally held that a collateral attack
may be maintained only for fraud in procurement or lack of jurisdiction. Gavenda Bros. v. Elkins Limestone Co., 145 W. Va. 732,
116 S.E.2d 910 (1960).
The problem in the instant case involves jurisdiction. Prior to
the rendering of this decision by the United States Supreme Court,
courts were divided over the issue of a defective judgment providing a basis for collateral attack. Some courts advanced the view
that erroneous exercise of jurisdiction established a ground for
collateral attack. West End IrrigationCo. v. Garvey, 117 Colo. 109,
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